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the death penalty. [d. at 262,600 A.2d
at 425. The court emphasized that this
was a capital prosecution, and therefore involved an enhanced punishment.
It compared the case at bar to others
involving enhanced sentencing for recidivists in which it had required more
than identical names to support a presumption of identity of person. [d. at
264-5, 600 A.2d at 426.
The court cited as persuasive authority cases from other jurisdictions
in which a witness attrial was unable to
identify the defendant as the person
who had previously confessed to him.
[d. at261, 600 A.2dat424 (citing York
v. State, 173 N.W.2d 693 (Wis. 1970);
Fisherv. State, 361 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1962)). In those cases
testimony concerning the confessions
was admitted and the convictions were
affinned on appeal. The appellate
courts relied on the fact that other
witnesses, who were present but did
not hear the confessions, were able to
identify the defendants at trial and place
them in the company of the witnesses
who heard and testified to the confessions.
Thus, the court reasoned that while
Spells was able to identify the person
who had confessed to him by name,
nickname, and the fact that he had a
mid-body injury, his failure to identify
the petitioner at trial, combined with
the lack of any evidence that the two
men were together in jail, resulted in an
inadequate evidentiary foundation to
admit the testimony. Woodson, 325
Md. at 263, 600 A.2d at 425. ''To
admit such evidence," the court stated,
"would be, for example, to sanction the
testimony ofany witness who, without
more, claims that a voice on the telephone, which he cannot recognize as
the defendant's, identified himself using the name of the defendant, and
confessed to the crime." [d.
The court acknowledged that there
is some authority that "[i]dentical
names give rise to a presumption of
identity of person." The court reasoned however, "[a]ssuming,
arguendo, that the use of Woodson's

name alone would raise a rebuttable
presumption of identity, the presumption was nullified when Spells testified
that the person who confessed to him
was not in the courtroom." [d. at 264,
600 A.2d at 426. The court held that in
the circumstances of the case, Spells'
conversation was inadmissible hearsay, and to admit it was reversible error
requiring remand for a new trial. [d.
It appears from the ruling in
Woodson that when considering the
admissibility ofconfessions in the context enhanced sentence cases, the Gourt
of Appeals of Maryland will construe
the "circumstances ofthe case" broadly.
Such breadth illustrates the court's distinction of the penalty as part and parcel of the circumstances surrounding
the confession.
- Chris Marts
Molzo/ v. United States: SUPREME
COURT CHOOSES TRADITIONAL DEFINITION FOR "PUNITIVE DAMAGES" UNDER
FEDERAL TORTS CLAIMS ACT.

In the wake of the intense controversy surrounding his appointment to
the nation's highest court, Justice
Clarence Thomas wrote his first United
States Supreme Court opinion for the
Court's unanimous decision to follow
tradition when defming "punitive damages" under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680,
the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA).
In Molzo/v. United States, 112 S. Ct.
711 (1992), the Court undertook an
exercise in statutory interpretation by
following deeply rooted common law
principles requiring proof of a
defendant's culpability before a plaintiff can recover punitive damages. As
such, punitive damages under the
FTCA are a specific category of damages, the recovery ofwhich depends on
proof ofintentional or flagrant conduct
and the purpose of which is to punish a
defendant for such conduct.
The guardian ad litem of Mr. Robert Molzof brought an action against
the U.S. Government after Mr. Molzof
sustained irreversable brain damage

that left him comatose in a Veterans
Administration hospital as a result of
the employees' negligence. Mr. Molzof
sought damages under the FTCA for
supplemental medical care, future
medical expenses, and loss of enjoyment of life.
The Government conceded to negligence, and at the conclusion of the
bench trial concerning only damages,
the Federal District Court ordered the
hospital to continue the level of care it
had already been providing Molzof in
addition to paying for weekly doctor's
visits and care beyond that which the
hospital could offer. The court refused, however, to award damages reflecting the cost of care already available or damages for loss of enjoyment
of life. Mr. Molzof died after final
judgement from the district court, at
which time Mrs. Shirley Molzof resumed the action as the personal representative of her husband's estate.
Mrs. Molzoftook exception to the
limitations the district court placed on
recovery for Mr. Molzofsdemise. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit nevertheless agreed with the lower
court and maintained that any award
exceeding compensation, including
loss of enjoyment of life, was "punitive in effect" and beyond recovery
under the Federal Torts Claim Act.
112 S. Ct. at 714. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in
order to define "punitive damages"
under the FTCA.
The Court began its analysis by
examining the history behind the
FTCA. Having tolerated a laborious
legislative process for compensating
those individuals injured by federal
emp loyees' negligence, Congress
passed the FTCA. The legislation
would allow such victims to sue the
U.S. Government and recover through
a limited waiver of the Government's
sovereign immunity. The Court recognized that, although state law must be
consulted in order to determine the
extent to which the United States can
be held liable under the FTCA, "punitive damages" would in no way recov-
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erable under the FfCA. Id. at 714-15.
In an effort to detennine if damages
from loss of enjoyment of life and
duplicate fees were prohibited as ''punitive damages" in the FfCA, the Court
considered definitions from both parties. Mrs. Molzof suggested that the
Court refer to traditional common law
and choose a standard for classifying
punitive damages as those intended to
punish a defendant for "egregious conduct." Mrs. Molzof asserted that. because her claimed damages did not
involve egregious conduct. she should
be able to recover. Id. at 715. In
contrast. the Government suggested
defming punitive damages as any award
which is not strictly compensatory.
This strict definition would disallow
recovery ofdamages which exceeded a
plaintiffs actual loss. The Government substantiated its position by suggesting that such extra-compensatory
awards are ''punitive in effect.·· Id.
After distinguishing ''punitive damages" from damages which are ''punitive in effect." the Court accepted the
Mrs. Molzofs proposed definition. Id.
The Court explained that ''punitive
damages" is a tenn of art which requires no explanation in American legal circles. and that Congress spent 28
years grappling over the details of the
FfCAbefore it became law. Id. at716.
In light of these realities. the Court
decided it must adopt the widely accepted definition of ''punitive damages:' i.e.• those "awarded to punish
defendants for torts committed with
fraud. malice. violence. or oppression."
in the absence of language to the contrary in the FfCA or its legislative
history. Id. at 717. By drawing the
distinction between ''punitive damages" and those damages which are
''punitive in effect." the Court quickly
disqualified the Government's argument as inconsistent with the statutory
language of the FfCA.
The Court opined that the Government premised its argument on the
assumption that FfCA's limited waiver
of sovereign immunity would not allow damages other than those that are
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compensatory. The Court viewed such
a premise as a distortion ofthe actual
statutory language which clearly indicates that a plaintiff may recover those
damages "not legally considered 'punitivedamages', butwhichareforsome
reason above and beyond ordinary notions ofcompensation ...." Id. at 716.
A jury's award to a plaintiff beyond
that which seems actually compensatory would not automatically fall in the
category of''punitive damages." Such
an excess would relate only to the
amount and not the nature of the damages. The Court explained that they
must embody the element of the
defendant's culpability before excessive damages would be deemed punitive in nature under the common law.
Id.
The Court noted three problems
with the Government's argument. First,
interpreting ''punitive damages" as any
damages in excess of or not related to
actual compensation for loss, as the
Government suggested, would make it
extremely difficult for a court to tabulate the award and result in outlandish
judgments. For example, to avoid
double payment from the Government,
a court would have to consider the
plaintiffs day-to-day savings, such as
rent and utilities, which would result
from an award of future medical expenses. The Court felt that this effort
would be far too meticulous for courts
to undertake. Yet, because common
law has traditionally considered double
and treble damages as a form of punitive damages, such duplicative payments would necessarily have to be
nonrecoverable
under
the
Government's proposed meaning of
the FfCA. Id. at 717.
Secondly, with regard to the spectrum of claims under the FfCA to
which liquidated damages or fixed levels ofcompensation apply, an interpretation of "punitive damages" as offered by the Government would force
courts into the business of figuring the
actual loss in every case before them.
Id. It often happens that these types of
awards do not correspond to the

plaintiffs actual loss. According to
the Government's strict proposed definition, such awards would be ''punitive damages," and therefore not recoverable, if they exceeded the
plaintiffs actual loss.
The third problem the Court found
with the Government's argument involved it's reliance on the previous
efforts of the Court to depart from
traditional common law principles.
None ofthose efforts related to statutory tenns that are as deeply rooted flS
the concept of ''punitive damages."
Various terms in the FfCA, such as
"discretionary function," have few antecedents from which to draw a sound
definition. Id. Likewise. there is sometimes no basis in the common law of
most states from which to drawameaning. Only then is it necessary for the
Court to depart from traditional common law principles. Id.
As far as Mrs. Molzofs claims
were concerned. the Court concluded
that only those damages which are
legally defined as ''punitive damages"
under the common law are not recoverable under the FfCA. According to
this defmition. damages associated with
loss of enjoyment oflife and duplicate
costs do not fall in this nonrecoverable
category of damages. but the lower
court would have to examine Wisconsin law and detennine exactly which
damages Mrs. Molzof could recover.
Id. at 718.
The Court's conclusion in MolzoJ
leaves virtually no question unanswered
concerning the classification of''punitive damages." Courts relying on the
language and structure ofthe FfCA to
decide the nature of awards sought
against the Government now have a
workable standard for producing consistent results. The decision in MolzoJ
seems to attenuate cynicism regarding
the Supreme Court' s alleged conservative reputation by deciding against the
Government's interests and showing
sympathy for plaintiffs. This decision
may convey a message that today's
Court is striving for consistent adjudication of claims under statutes like the

FTCA by relying on the plain, clear,
and established meaning of the terms
therein. Such a reliance may simplify
the process of determining awards for
lower courts in the future.
- Mike Muldowney
Lechmere. Inc. v. NLRE:
NONEMPLOYEE UNION ORGANIZERS MAY BE BARRED
FROM AN EMPLOYER'S PROPERTY ABSENT A SHOWING OF
INACCESSIBILITY OF EMPLOYEES.
In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRE, 112 S.
Ct. 841 (1992), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its earlier interpretation of
nonemployee union organizational
rights, and specifically rejected a trend
recently adopted by the National Labor
Relations Board (" Board"). The Court
held that an employer may prohibit
nonemployee union organizers from
entering upon its property, where reasonable access to employees may be
had elsewhere. In so doing, the Court
explicitly rejected the Board's application ofa balancing testto determine the
rights of non employee union organizers.
In 1987, Local 919 of the United
Food and Commercial Workers Union
("Union") began a campaign aimed at
organizing the non-represented employees ofLechrnere, Inc., a retail store
located in Newington, Connecticut. On
several occasions, the union organizers entered Lechmere's parking lot
without permission and began placing
handbills on the cars of Lechmere's
employees. On each occasion,
Lechrnere's manager asked the union
organizers to leave company property
and then removed the handbills. The
union organizers continued their organizational activities and began picketing Lechmere's store from an area adjacent to the company parking lot.
Through additional efforts, the Union
was ableto contact approximately 20%
of Lechmere's employees by mail,
many of whom lived in the surrounding metropolitan area.

When the Union's organizational
attempts failed to yield any success,
they filed an unfair laborpractice charge
with the Board. An administrative law
judge ruled in favor of the Union and
recommended, in part, that Lechmere
be ordered to allow the Union onto its
property. The Board affirmed this
ruling and adopted the judge's recommendation, applying the analysis of its
opinion inJean Country, 291 N.L.R.B.
11 (1988). The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit denied
Lechrnere's petition for review and
enforced the Board's order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed
the judgment of the First Circuit, and
denied enforcement ofthe Board's order.
In an opinion by Justice Thomas,
the Court began its analysis by looking
to the National Labor Relations Act
("Act"). The Court noted that section
7 of the Act gave employees the right
to organize or join a labor union. The
Court further noted that this right is
protected by section 8(a)(I), which
makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere or restrict the
exercise of this right by employees.
Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 845. As the
Court pointed out, there is a "critical
distinction between the organizing activities of employees . . . and
nonemployees .... " Id. The Court
held that the Act "confers rights only
on employees, not on unions or their
nonemployee organizers." Id. (emphasis in original). However, the Court
did recognize that, under some circumstances, the Act may restrict an
employer's right to exclude union organizers who are not employees.
The Court next reviewed relevant
case law dealing with this issue and
determined as a general rule that "an
employer cannot be compelled to allow distribution of union literature by
nonemployee organizers on his property." Id. at 846 (quoting NLRE v.
Babcock& Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105,
112 (1956». In addition, the Court
noted that the exception to this rule
was extremely narrow, and that "[t]o

gain access, the union has the burden
of showing that no reasonable means
[of reaching] the employees exists ..
.." Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 847 (quoting Sears, Roebuck& Co. v. San Diego
County District Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205 (1978».
The Court concluded that the facts
in this case did not justify an application of this narrow exception to the
general rule that an employer may restrict nonemployee distribution of
union literature on company property.
Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 848. The
Court held that the Union had reasonable alternative means to reach the
employees, and in so finding, specifically rejected the Board's conclusion
with repect to this issue. Id. at 848-49.
The Court explained that nonemployee
organizers could only compel an employer to open his property to their
organizational efforts where" the location ofa plant and the living quarters of
the employees place the employees
beyond the reach of [the Union]." Id.
(quoting Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S.
at 113). Although reaching the employees at their homes may have been
"cumbersome or less-than-ideally effective," this fact did not bring the
Union within the narrow inaccessibility exception enumerated in Babcock.
Id.
The Court explicitly rejected the
Board's application ofa balancing test
to this factual situation. In finding an
unfair labor practice, the Board relied
upon its holding inJean Country where
they determined that an employer's
property rights could be infringed in
favor of the rights of an organization.
Id. at 849 (citing Jean Country, 291
N.L.R.B. 11 (1988». This analysis,
however, failed to take into consideration the distinction between the rights
of employee organizers and those of
nonemployee organizers. Lechmere.
112 S. Ct. at 849. The Court decided,
therefore, that the Board's application
ofa balancing test was inappropriate in
that it was inconsistent with the Court's
prior decisions. Id. The Court also
stated that a balancing test was inap-
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